IBC Meeting Minutes

Chair- Ken Bondioli
Research Safety- Abigail Fish
Tuesday, November 18, 2025
1:30 pm via Zoom

Institutions *Louisiana State University Agricultural and Mechanical College (A&M)*
Louisiana State University Ag Center

IBC Members			
	Ken Bondioli	LSU Ag Center	Chair, Animal Expert
	Abigail Fish	LSU A&M	BSO, Administrator, Voting Contact
	Sarah Keeton	LSU A&M	BSO
	Sue Hagius	LSU Ag Center	Animal Expert, Lab Rep
	Michael Hooks	LSU A&M	Member
	Jong Ham	LSU Ag Center	Plant Expert
	Christy White	Pennington Biomedical Research Center	Non-Voting Member
	Jeff Davis	LSU Ag Center	Plant and Insect Expert
	Niranjan Baisakh	LSU Ag Center	Plant Expert
	William Doerrler	LSU A&M	Member
	Ramanuj Lahiri	National Hansen's Disease Program	Member
	Rebecca Christofferson	LSU A&M	Member
	Michelle Dennis	Our Lady of the Lake Hospital	Local Non-Affiliated Member
	Brent Stanfield	LSU A&M	Member
	Ryoichi Teruyama	LSU A&M	Member

Members Present:	Ken Bondioli, Sue Hagius, Niranjan Baisakh (arrived at 1:55 pm), Abigail Fish, William Doerrler, Michael Hooks, Ramanuj Lahiri, Jong Ham, Ryoichi Teruyama, Brent Stanfield, and Sarah Keeton	
Members Absent:	Christy White, Michelle Dennis, Jeff Davis, and Rebecca Christofferson.	
Others Present:	Samithamby Jeyaseelan	Professor, Department of Pathobiological Sciences
	Duane Jeansome	Professor, Department of Pathobiological Sciences
	Huaizhi Wang	PhD Candidate, Representative for Jian Xu
	Ya Zhang	PhD Candidate, Representative for Jian Xu

Call to Order: 1:34 pm

Approval of Minutes from: Meeting minutes from Thursday, September 11, 2025

Motion Made by:	Sue Hagius
Seconded by:	William Doerrler
Abstaining:	None

Meeting minutes from Thursday, October 9, 2025

Motion Made by:	Sue Hagius
Seconded by:	William Doerrler
Abstaining	None

Business and Call for New Business

No new business was discussed

New IBC Registrations and Amendments for Review

Reg. #	PI Name	Affiliation of PI	Date Received	Title of Project	Reviewer 1	Reviewer 2
24052 (Amendment)	Aaron Bivins	Civil and Environmental Engineering	10/29/2025	Hydrogel Particles to Enable High Throughput Screening of Soft Fruits for Intact Hepatitis A Virus	Michael Hooks	Jong Ham

Project Overview:

This amendment aims to refine the project's assay development workflow for detecting hepatitis A virus (HAV) in produce wash samples. Initial experiments using a non-infectious Armored RNA control were unsuccessful, as the affinity capture step did not effectively recover the encapsulated RNA. To determine whether this limitation reflects a failure of the Armored RNA surrogate or a genuine limitation of the capture workflow, the research team proposes incorporating a hepatitis A virus control material (ATCC VR-1357) for method evaluation.

The project will use functionalized hydrogel nanoparticles (Nanotrap Microbiome A particles), RNA extraction, and RT-digital PCR to concentrate HAV from fruit wash eluates, isolate viral RNA, and detect and quantify target sequences. The workflow will be developed in a stepwise manner from the analytical RT-dPCR endpoint upstream to the nanoparticle-based concentration step, using HAV (ATCC VR-1357) as the control material.

The HAV control strain will be handled in accordance with BSL-2 containment and standard virological practices. No genetic modification of the virus is proposed, and the work is limited to assay development, concentration testing, and nucleic acid detection. The findings are expected to clarify the performance of the affinity capture system and improve the sensitivity and reliability of HAV screening methods for food safety applications.

Risk Assessment and Discussion:

This project presents moderate biosafety risk consistent with work involving infectious viral controls and nucleic acid detection assays. The original protocol used only non-infectious Armored RNA and in vitro–transcribed RNA and was previously approved at BSL-1. With this amendment, the research team now proposes to incorporate hepatitis A virus (HAV) control material (ATCC VR-1357) to evaluate the performance of the capture and detection workflow.

Potential hazards relate to handling infectious HAV, a non-enveloped, positive-sense RNA virus capable of causing acute hepatitis through fecal–oral exposure routes, and therefore requiring careful attention to hand hygiene, surface decontamination, and avoidance of accidental ingestion or contact with contaminated materials. Laboratory risks also include potential exposure during aerosol-generating procedures such as pipetting, vortexing, or sample

concentration. These risks are effectively managed through Biosafety Level 2 (BSL-2) containment, including use of biological safety cabinets, appropriate PPE, and strict adherence to LSU's biosafety and disinfection protocols.

No viral propagation, genetic modification, or passaging is proposed. The HAV control material will be handled only until chemical lysis inactivates the virus during RNA extraction. All activities involving intact HAV fall within BSL-2 requirements and remain compliant with NIH Guidelines and the BMBL for work with non-enveloped enteric viruses.

With these precautions in place, the project is considered a moderate risk but appropriately contained under standard **BSL-2 practices**. No environmental or security concerns are anticipated.

NIH Guidelines:	Not Applicable.
Biosafety Level:	BSL-2
Training Requirements:	All personnel, including the PI, involved in this project must complete BSL-2 training in accordance with LSU's Environmental Health and Safety (EHS) and Institutional Biosafety Committee (IBC) requirements. All training must be completed before beginning work and refreshed as required by LSU policies and SOPs.
IBC Vote:	**Approved at BSL-2 pending receipt of modifications**
Motion made by:	Michael Hooks
Seconded by:	Jong Ham
Abstaining:	None
Conflicts of Interest:	None

Requested Modifications:

Reg. #	PI Name	Affiliation of PI	Date Received	Title of Project	Reviewer 1	Reviewer 2
25003 (Amendment)	Jian Xu	Electrical and Computer Engineering	11/03/2025	Biomedical Devices for Image-Guided Surgery	Sarah Keeton	Brent Stanfield

Project Overview:

This project seeks to improve the accuracy of cancer surgery by developing a fluorescence/Raman image-guided technique capable of identifying cancers in real time. The research team will use a custom-designed optical imaging system—including fluorescence cameras and spectroscopic devices—to visualize tumor boundaries with greater precision. The overall goal of this research is to refine a next-generation imaging approach that could ultimately enhance surgical outcomes by enabling clearer and more accurate identification of cancer margins during resection.

The study uses mouse models bearing xenografted human tumors. The only human material involved consists of well-characterized human cancer cell lines that are implanted into immunocompromised mice; no primary human tissues, fluids, or other human-derived materials are used. All manipulations of the human cell lines—including thawing, culturing, preparation, and injection into animals—will continue to be performed under Biosafety Level 2 (BSL-2) conditions inside a certified Class II biological safety cabinet.

OSHA BBP Standard 1910.1030 typically requires BSL-2 containment for work involving "other potentially infectious materials" (OPIM). However, OSHA's 1994 letter of interpretation clarifies that established human cell lines that are documented to be free of human hepatitis viruses, HIV, and other recognized bloodborne pathogens are not considered OPIM. Because this project utilizes only well-characterized cell lines, OSHA permits institutions to determine the appropriate containment based on biosafety risk. OSHA explicitly recommends that the final judgment be made by biosafety professionals—in this case, the LSU IBC. (See attached OSHA interpretation letter.)

Based on this guidance, the amendment requests downgrading the animal housing component of the study from ABSL-2 to ABSL-1, as the mice themselves do not pose an elevated biosafety risk once injected with clean, well-characterized cell lines. Importantly, all work involving the handling or manipulation of human cells will still occur at BSL-2, and all injections will continue to be performed inside a BSC to maintain full protection of personnel and the environment.

Risk Assessment and Discussion:	This project presents a low to moderate biosafety risk consistent with work involving established human cell lines and immunocompromised mice. The only human-derived materials used are well-characterized human cancer cell lines verified to be free of hepatitis viruses, HIV, and other recognized bloodborne pathogens. Under OSHA's 1994 letter of interpretation, such cell lines are not considered OPIM and therefore do not require ABSL-2 housing once introduced into animals. All manipulations of the human cancer cell lines—including culture, preparation, and injection into mice, will continue to be conducted under BSL-2 containment inside a Class II biological safety cabinet. Potential hazards relate primarily to accidental exposure during these upstream steps, which are effectively mitigated through standard BSL-2 practices, PPE, proper sharps handling, and routine decontamination procedures. Following injections, the animals do not shed infectious agents, and xenografted tumors do not pose additional biosafety risks during routine husbandry. For this reason, ABSL-1 housing is appropriate for post-procedure animal care. However, the IBC requires that all personnel—including research staff and animal husbandry staff—wear surgical masks whenever handling the animals. This additional precaution provides an extra layer of protection during close-contact work and further reduces any minimal residual risk associated with the implanted human cells. No pathogens, viral vectors, or biological toxins are used in this study. With BSL-2 containment maintained for all cell manipulations and surgical masks required during all animal handling, the project is considered low overall risk, and no environmental or security concerns are anticipated.
NIH Guidelines:	Not Applicable
Biosafety Level:	BSL-2 and ABSL-1 with additional PPE
Training Requirements:	All personnel, including the PI, involved in this project must complete BSL-2 training in accordance with LSU's Environmental Health and Safety (EHS) and Institutional Biosafety Committee (IBC) requirements. In addition, all staff involved in animal procedures or husbandry must complete LSU's approved animal handling and species-specific training as required by the IACUC. All training must be completed before beginning work and refreshed as required by LSU policies and SOPs.
IBC Vote:	**Approved at BSL-2 and ABSL-1 pending receipt of modifications**
Motion made by:	Sarah Keeton
Seconded by:	Brent Stanfield
Abstaining:	Not applicable
Conflicts of Interest:	Not applicable

Confidential - Not subject to NIH Guidelines

Reg. #	PI Name	Affiliation of PI	Date Received	Title of Project	Reviewer 1	Reviewer 2
25038 (On Hold)	Rebecca Christofferson	Pathobiological Sciences	10/3/2025	Investigating Prevalence of Acute Infection and Exposure to Arboviruses in a Retrospective Cohort from Colombia	Brent Stanfield	Michelle Dennis

Project Overview:

This project aims to assess both acute infection and prior exposure to several arboviruses of public health importance in Colombia. Using an already collected cohort of human serum samples, the research team will determine the prevalence of active infection with dengue virus, chikungunya virus, Zika virus, Bunyamwera virus, Oropouche virus, and Caraparu virus through molecular detection methods. The project will also evaluate past exposure to these viruses by performing serological assays on the same samples to identify virus-specific antibodies.

These analyses will provide a clearer understanding of circulating arboviruses in the study region, support improved epidemiological surveillance, and contribute to a broader understanding of the arboviral disease burden in endemic areas.

Risk Assessment and Discussion:	This project presents a moderate biosafety risk consistent with work involving human serum that may contain arboviruses, including chikungunya virus (CHIKV). Because CHIKV is handled under BSL-3 at LSU, all primary sample manipulations—receiving, opening, aliquoting, and initial testing—will be conducted in a BSL-3 laboratory inside a certified Class II biological safety cabinet. Human serum is considered *other potentially infectious material* (OPIM) under the OSHA Bloodborne Pathogens Standard and may contain bloodborne pathogens or additional co-infections. The primary hazards involve potential exposure to infectious arboviruses or other bloodborne agents via spills, splashes, mucous membrane contact, aerosols generated during pipetting or vortexing, or sharps injuries. These risks are mitigated by BSL-3 engineering controls and practices, including use of a BSC for all open handling, enhanced PPE (gloves, lab coat/gown, eye/face protection, and any respiratory protection required by LSU policy), restricted access, and rigorous spill response and decontamination procedures. Within the BSL-3, viral RNA will be extracted using inactivation-compatible lysis buffers that render the samples non-infectious. Inactivated RNA and serum samples that test negative for chikungunya virus may then be transferred to a BSL-2 laboratory for downstream molecular and serologic assays. Serum samples that test positive for chikungunya virus will remain in the BSL-3 facility. No virus culture, propagation, or amplification of live virus is proposed at either containment level. With all potentially CHIKV-positive specimens handled exclusively under BSL-3 containment and only inactivated RNA or confirmed CHIKV-negative material handled under BSL-2, the overall biosafety risk is considered moderate but appropriately controlled. Standard LSU biosafety and bloodborne pathogen procedures for waste management, disinfection, and training further minimize risk. No environmental or security concerns are anticipated.
NIH Guidelines:	Not Applicable
Biosafety Level:	BSL-2 and BSL-3
Training Requirements:	All personnel, including the PI, involved in this project must complete BSL-3 training in accordance with LSU's Environmental Health and Safety (EHS) and Institutional Biosafety Committee (IBC) requirements. All training must be completed before beginning work and refreshed as required by LSU policies and SOPs.
IBC Vote:	**Approved at BSL-2 and BSL-3 pending receipt of modifications** Motion made by: Brent Stanfield Seconded by: Abigail Fish Abstaining: None Conflicts of Interest: None

Confidential - Not subject to NIH Guidelines

Reg. #	PI Name	Affiliation of PI	Date Received	Title of Project	Reviewer 1	Reviewer 2
25057 (On Hold)	Samithamby Jeyaseelan	Pathobiological Sciences	10/29/2025	Innate Defense Against Bacterial Pneumonia and Polymicrobial Sepsis Using Lentiviral Vectors	William Doerrler	Ryoichi Teruyama

Project Overview:	This project examines how key innate immune pathways contribute to host defense against bacterial pneumonia and polymicrobial sepsis. Pulmonary infections remain a major cause of mortality, and increasing antibiotic resistance underscores the need for new therapeutic strategies. The study will evaluate whether innate immune molecules such as NLRP10, NRF2, and CD38 play essential roles in controlling lung infections and systemic inflammatory responses. Using wild-type and gene-deficient mouse strains, the research will assess how modulation of these pathways influences susceptibility to major pulmonary bacterial pathogens and to polymicrobial sepsis. Outcomes will focus on bacterial clearance and innate immune activation. The overall goal is to identify innate immune mechanisms that could be targeted to improve resistance to severe bacterial infections and support the development of new treatment approaches.
Risk Assessment and Discussion:	This project presents a moderate biosafety risk due to the use of several BSL-2 pulmonary bacterial pathogens capable of causing significant disease in humans. These organisms pose risks through accidental aerosol exposure, mucous membrane contact, or sharps injuries. All pathogen handling, preparation of inocula, and infection procedures must be performed under BSL-2/ABSL-2 containment using a Class II BSC, appropriate PPE, and LSU's biosafety and disinfection practices. The study also uses replication-incompetent lentiviral vectors to modulate innate immune pathways. These vectors pose a low but notable risk of accidental exposure; hazards are mitigated through standard BSL-2 viral vector practices, proper sharps handling, and use of containment equipment during administration. Animal infection work introduces additional exposure risks during inoculation and post-infection handling. These are effectively managed through ABSL-2 housing, PPE requirements, species-specific animal handling training, and established decontamination and waste procedures. With these controls in place, the project is considered appropriately contained under BSL-2/ABSL-2 conditions, and no environmental or security concerns are anticipated.
NIH Guidelines:	Section III-D-4-b
Biosafety Level:	BSL-2, ABSL-2 and BL2-N
Training Requirements:	All personnel, including the PI, involved in this project must complete BSL-2 training in accordance with LSU's Environmental Health and Safety (EHS) and Institutional Biosafety Committee (IBC) requirements. All training must be completed before beginning work and refreshed as required by LSU policies and SOPs.
IBC Vote:	**Approved at BSL-2, ABSL-2 and BL2-N pending receipt of modifications** Motion made by: William Doerrler

Seconded by:	Ryoichi Teruyama
Abstaining:	William Doerrler
Conflicts of Interest:	None

Requested Modifications:

- Section A. Project Information.
  - Locations. Please add the room numbers for the location of the freezer and animal work.
  - Personnel. Training. Please ensure all lab personnel, including the PI, complete the EHS-required online BSL2 safety training and that all courses are listed under specific training.
- Section B. Project Description.
  - Procedures and Methods. Please include a sentence about bacterial culture techniques being previously approved and reference IBC 25032. Please briefly describe cell culture methods. Please indicate if you will be using lentiviral particles or lentiviral-infected cells in mice. Please clarify which stem cells and macrophages you plan to use. Please also indicate which BSC in which work takes place. For example, lentiviral vector administration into mice will take place in the DLAM BSC. Please clarify what "cell pellet will be used for cell migration into the airspace" means. Please ensure you indicate when potentially infectious material is inactivated for all procedures.
- Section C. Risk Evaluation.
  - Containment Level. Please uncheck BL1-N and check BL2-N.
  - Biosafety. Please relocate information on waste disposal to the biosecurity section and update to reflect current practices. Please provide information on BSC usage. Please specify the type of mask being worn and indicate what PPE is required for lab work versus animal work.
  - Biosecurity. Please indicate that you use primary and secondary leak-proof containment for transport.
- Section D. Project Units.
  - Please change no to yes for items 11 and 12.
- Section F. Recombinant DNA
  - Please indicate the species of coding sequences. Please specify which type of stem cells and macrophages are used. Please change no to yes for "will you use animal/plant cells".
- Section G. Transgenic Animals.
  - Please specify what standard animal housing is. Please update disposal information for animals.
- Section N. Safety
  - Stock Cultures. Please confirm the location of the freezer.

Reg. #	PI Name	Affiliation of PI	Date Received	Title of Project	Reviewer 1	Reviewer 2

25065	Rebecca Christofferson	Pathobiological Sciences	10/3/2025	Investigation of Factors Altering Transmission Potential of Mosquito - Borne Viruses	Sue Hagius	Sarah Keeton

Project Overview:

This project investigates the environmental and intrinsic factors that shape arbovirus transmission by mosquito vectors. The research focuses on viruses transmitted by *Aedes aegypti*, *Aedes albopictus*, and *Sabethes cyaneus*, examining the processes that determine vector competence, including midgut infection, dissemination to peripheral tissues, and transmission through saliva.

Mosquitoes are exposed to virus through standard membrane feeding, and infection status is evaluated at defined timepoints by testing abdomens, legs, and saliva. The project also examines how variables such as mosquito strain, field-derived populations, incubation temperature, and larval developmental conditions influence susceptibility and infection kinetics.

The overall goal is to identify the biological and environmental determinants that contribute to efficient arbovirus transmission and shape disease ecology.

Risk Assessment and Discussion:	This project presents a moderate to high biosafety risk due to the experimental infection of mosquitoes with RG 2 and RG 3 arboviruses. These pathogens have the potential to cause human disease, and work with infected vectors requires strict adherence to arthropod containment practices to prevent accidental exposure or escape. All procedures involving infectious materials, such as bloodmeal preparation, mosquito feeding, dissections, and saliva collection, will be conducted under the appropriate biosafety and arthropod containment levels (ACL-2 or ACL-3), depending on the risk group of the virus in use. All mosquito handling, including feeding and dissections, will be performed inside a glove box, which provides an additional physical barrier to prevent vector escape and further reduces the likelihood of accidental exposure. Primary hazards include exposure to infectious blood, accidental aerosol generation during mosquito manipulations, bites from infected vectors, and the escape of infected mosquitoes. These risks are mitigated through multiple layers of containment, including the use of a glove box, double-door entry systems in the insectary, physical immobilization methods (cold/anesthesia), routine inspection of containment equipment, and strict waste decontamination procedures. All infectious materials, mosquitoes, and waste are managed in accordance with LSU EHS and IBC biosafety and arthropod containment policies. With these measures in place—including glove-box handling of all infected vectors—the work is considered appropriately contained within ACL-2 and ACL-3 environments, and no environmental or security concerns are anticipated.
NIH Guidelines:	Section III-D-1-a.
Biosafety Level:	BSL-2
Training Requirements:	All personnel, including the PI, involved in this project must complete BSL-2 and BSL-3 training, and arthropod containment in accordance with LSU's Environmental Health and Safety (EHS) and Institutional Biosafety Committee (IBC) requirements. All training must be completed before beginning work and refreshed as required by LSU policies and SOPs.
IBC Vote:	**Approved at BSL-2, BSL-3, ACL-2, and ACL-3 pending receipt of modifications** Motion made by: Sue Hagius Seconded by: Sarah Keeton Abstaining: None Conflicts of Interest: None

Requested Modifications:

- Section A. Project Goals

- Locations. Please add the insectary and freezer room numbers.
- Personnel. Training. Please have all lab personnel, including the PI, complete the EHS-required online BSL-3 safety training and list the courses under specific training.

- Section B. Project Description.
  - Procedures and Methods. Please briefly describe cell culture and viral culture techniques or reference the approved IBC protocol where the work is described. Please elaborate on environmental factors. Specifically indicate what environmental factors you manipulate, how they are done, and whether these factors are manipulated before or after infection. Please state which species of mosquitoes you use. Please elaborate on the process of feeding, including details on containment during the feeding process. Please add a general statement on containment during transport, and that appropriate PPE for BSL2 or BSL3 is worn.
- Section C. Risk Evaluation.
  - Biosafety. Please briefly describe how escaped mosquitoes are handled and attach SOP for escaped arthropods as indicated in this section.
  - Biosecurity. Please ensure the room numbers listed here align with the room numbers under Section A, Locations. Please briefly describe waste management for BSL2 and BSL3, including how mosquitoes are handled. Please briefly describe secure transport and building and BSL2 security.
- Section M. Human or Primate Blood, Bodily Fluids, or Tissues.
  Containment, Disposal, and Destruction Measures. Please ensure this information aligns with the information listed under Section B, Biosecurity, and Section N. Disinfection/Decontamination table.
- Section N. Safety.
  - Disinfection/Decontamination. Please uncheck 10% bleach for solid waste and check for liquid waste. Please check quat for routine cleaning and spills.
  - Stock Cultures. Please confirm room numbers where stocks are stored and list under Section A, Locations.

Reg. #	PI Name	Affiliation of PI	Date Received	Title of Project	Reviewer 1	Reviewer 2
25066	Yong Hwan Lee	Biological Sciences	10/15/2025	Salmonella-Vectored Down Regulation of Fructose-2,6-Biphosphate for Suppression of Tumor Proliferation	Ryoichi Teruyama	Sue Hagius

Project Overview:	Due to insufficient information in the initial submission, the registration was returned to the PI for additional detail and revision before it can proceed to full committee review..
Risk Assessment and Discussion:	The IBC determined that the application did not contain sufficient information to complete a risk assessment; therefore, the registration has been placed “on hold” pending receipt of additional details.

NIH Guidelines:	To be determined
Biosafety Level:	To be determined
Training Requirements:	To be determined.

IBC Vote:	**No motion was made. The protocol was placed "ON HOLD".**	
	Motion made by:	Not applicable
	Seconded by:	Not applicable
	Abstaining:	Not applicable
	Conflicts of Interest:	Not applicable

Requested Modifications:

- Section A. Project Information.
  - Locations. Please list the buildings and room numbers for all work, including animal work, freezer rooms, BSC rooms, etc.
  - Personnel. Training. Please complete the EHS-required online safety training and list the courses under specific training.
- Section B. Project Description.
  - Project Goals. Please provide a comprehensive overview of the project's intended goals.
  - Procedures and Methods. Please provide a summary of all procedures planned to achieve the project's goals, including cell culture, animal work, and recombinant DNA work. Be sure to include where the work takes place and what occurs inside a BSC. Please also state how potentially infectious material is inactivated and what PPE is worn.
- Section C. Risk Evaluation.
  - Containment Level. Please review hazard information for the planned work, including biosafety level designations, and update this section accordingly.
  - Biosafety Please describe PPE worn when working in the lab and specify if additional PPE is required for animals. Please also include training requirements for all work, including work with rDNA and animals, and briefly describe the containment measures for aerosols. If you have written SOPs, it is recommended that you attach them here, but they may not be attached in lieu of completing this section.
  - Biosecurity. Please detail lab and building security for all locations where you plan to work. Please describe how solid and liquid biohazardous waste are handled. Please also detail how animal carcasses are handled. Please describe secure transport between labs and buildings. Please describe inventory management.
- Section D. Project Units.
  - Please change no to yes for items 8 and 9. *Salmonella typhimurium* is a pathogen that affects both humans and animals.
  - Please complete IACUC information. If no protocol has been submitted, please indicate "pending" here.
- Section F. Recombinant DNA.
  - DNA Guidelines. Please indicate what part of the NIH Guidelines your work falls under. Assistance can be obtained from the Assistant Director of Research Safety if needed.

    - Gene Products Effects. Please elaborate on the gene products and their effects.
- Section N. Safety.
    - Disinfection/Decontamination. Please review waste disposal procedures and update this section accordingly.
    - Biosafety Cabinet. Please answer questions pertaining to the BSC that will be used.

Upcoming Meetings: December 11, 2025 @1:30 pm via Zoom

Adjourned: 3:03 pm